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Products Liability
ROBERT L. PARKS,* ABIGAIL C. WArS-FTZGERALD**
AND THOMAS A. WATrS-FITzGERALD***
The authors discuss recent developments in Florida law in
the area of products liability. The distinctions between the three
theories of recovery in products liability actions, negligence, im-
plied warranty and strict liability, are clarified through close and
detailed analysis. The authors prefer strict liability to the other
two causes of action because of its lessened burden of proof on
plaintiffs and its less intricate analysis. The examination of case
law, however, leads the authors to conclude that the courts are
often applying the strict liability doctrine incorrectly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The essence of an action in tort involving liability for injuries
occasioned by the use of a product is to require a manufacturer to
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compensate members of the public if his product is found to be
* unreasonably dangerous by virtue of a defective condition.' The
application of the products liability label is a relatively recent devel-
opment; recovery by victims of defective products, however, has
long been familiar in the tort area, initially under common law
negligence theories and later under various warranty theories. The
plethora of theories of recovery has contributed t6-the confusion
among the courts and commentators that has characterized this
area.' The efforts of the American Law Institute have been benefi-
cial in codifying the principles and concepts of strict liability for
manufacturers of products deemed to contain defective conditions
that are unreasonably dangerous.3 Strict liability has taken its place
with negligence and warranty in the arsenal of plaintiffs' attorneys,
with excellent effect. By virtue of the variations inherent in these
theories, previously insurmountable hurdles to recovery have been
overcome. Unfortunately, recent case law in Florida documents a
failure by the bench and the bar to distinguish sufficiently among
these actions and a distressing tendency for common law negligence
concepts to permeate strict liability actions. The extent to which
this has occurred and the ramifications for tort law will be devel-
oped more fully.
II. THEORIES OF REcOVERY
A. Negligence
As one of the central characters in the field of products liability,
it is poetically just that an automobile should be the instrumental-
ity responsible for ushering in the modern view of negligence in
products liability. The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.' has been cited innumerable times since Judge Cardozo
penned the opinion stating the rule that manufacturers owe an af-
firmative duty of reasonable care in the design and manufacture of
their products.' The formal acceptance of the MacPherson ruling
occurred in the Restatement of Torts § 395 (1934), establishing the
1. For a general discussion of the scope of the action in products liability and a collection
of alternative definitions, see 72 C.J.S. Products Liability §§ 1-3 (Supp. 1975).
2. As recently as 1968, one Florida court perceived the existence of 29 separate theories
related to products liability. Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA
1968).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5. For a case which retained the requirement that the instrumentality be potentially
dangerous for liability to inure to the manufacturer, see A.E. Finley & Assocs. v. Medley,
141 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).
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liability of the manufacturer if he failed to exercise reasonable care
in manufacturing a product which foreseeably would pose an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to a user or to those associated with the user
or consumer.' The liability that devolves upon the negligent manu-
facturer is founded on traditional negligence principles. Breach of a
duty, imposed by law, which is the legal cause of an injury is essen-
tial in a products liability action sounding in negligence. The scope
of the duty imposed depends upon the reasonable foreseeability of
injury from use of a given product. Even when courts are inclined
to characterize an action as involving an inherently dangerous com-
modity, the duty of the producer is not gauged under a standard
different from that of reasonable foreseeabilityA The characteriza-
tion of an action as a negligence action, rather than as an action
sounding in products liability, may have significant consequences
in terms of the applicable period during which access to the courts
will be allowed.
Section 95.11(3) (a) of the Florida Statutes' provides a four-year
period of limitation on negligence actions. The computation of the
four-year period is governed by section 95.031 which states, "in
these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under
any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action
accrues."'" Section 95.031(1) defines the time the cause accrues as
"when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs."'
Thus, the right to bring a simple negligence case involving personal
injury (as distinguished from a products liability case under a negli-
gence theory of recovery) would have a life expectancy of four years,
running from the moment the injury occurs. Subsection (2), how-
ever, takes a different tack. It is addressed to actions sounding in
products liability, wherein the time allowance runs "from the time
the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should
6. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 395 (1965) differed from the 1934 version by
reducing the "substantial bodily harm" criterion to merely "physical harm." The substantial
harm-trivial harm distinction has, in the opinion of some commentators, commingled con-
cerns of foreseeability with elements utilized to ascertain the level of damages recoverable.
For a discussion of the factors involved, see L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 1 PRODUCTS LiALmrrY
§ 5.03(1)(b)(ii) (1978).'
7. See, e.g., Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. 1958).
8. Compare Adair v. Island Club, 225 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) with Walker v.
National Gun Traders, Inc., 116 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960), for opposite outcomes in the
determination of a duty to third persons involving two inherently dangerous products, a
chlorine gas tank and a second hand revolver.
9. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a) (1977). Chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes was heavily revised
in 1974. 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-382.
10. FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1977).
11. Id. § 95.031(1).
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have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. '"' But,
rather than allowing the four years associated with a negligence
action, the products liability action need only begin "within twelve
years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its
original purchaser . . . regardless of the date the defect in the prod-
uct was or should have been discovered."' 3 The fundamental differ-
ence between a classic limitations statute and a statute extinguish-
ing any cause of action based on the passage of time from a delivery
date has been recognized by the Florida courts. The protection to
manufacturers of such a statute of repose is readily apparent-any
product delivered longer than twelve years past cannot support a
cause of action on the basis of products liability. If counsel for
plaintiff can convince the court that an injury caused by an instru-
mentality commonly considered a product is in reality one sounding
in negligence, the four-years-from-the-last-element rule will still
open the doors of the court, whether the instrumentality was de-
livered twelve or twenty years past. As yet, examples of the ingenu-
ity of plaintiffs' counsel in this area do not abound in the reported
opinions, but there is every likelihood that such cases will be
brought as negligence actions in the absence of any other recourse
to the courts. 5
Negligence may be defined as "the failure to do what a reason-
12. Id. § 95.031(2). Questions concerning the last element giving rise to the cause of
action and the time at which plaintiff had knowledge sufficient to start the statute running
often turn on minute distinctions. For a discussion of these problems in the context of medical
malpractice and negligence, see Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).
13. Id.
14. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978) (legislature has authority
to revise statute of limitations even though some plaintiffs would thereby lose right to bring
suit).
15. The validity of this absolute 12-year limitation was recently undermined by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, [19791 FLA. L. WEEKLY 103
(Fla. Mar. 1) (No. 76-2192). In Overland, the court held that FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1975)
was unconstitutional. The court construed FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (guarantee of access to
the courts) as an override of a statute of limitations which serves to bar a cause of action
before it legally exists. The court was confronted only with § 95.11(3)(c), which prevents a
cause founded on design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property from
arising against a professional engineer, registered architect or licensed contractor after 12
years. The rationale, however, would appear to make the holding applicable to FLA. STAT. §
95.031(2) as the pertinent language is virtually identical. Section 95.11(3)(c), the section
attacked in Overland, provides: "In any event the action must be commenced within 12 years
after the date of actual possession by the owner . . . ." Section 95.031(2) states: "Actions
for products liability. . . must be begun within the period prescribed. . . but in any event
within 12 years after the date of delivery .... Therefore, the continuing validity of § 95.031
as an absolute bar to a products liability action after 12 years have elapsed is questionable
at best.
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able and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the cir-
cumstances, or the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person
would not have done under the circumstances, resulting in injury to
another. '" One aspect of the cause of action in negligence, there-
fore, revolves around the existence of a defect in the product. The
presence of a defect is fundamental to all three forms of products
liability actions, with particular emphasis on the type of proof of the
defect required and the nexus of the defect to the alleged injury. In
negligence, it is essential to the cause of action, and often the most
troublesome burden, that the complaint allege that a defect in the
product was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 7 Simi-
larly, the burden of establishing proximate causation in a negligence
action requires that the plaintiff prove a specific defect. In strict
liability, by contrast, the plaintiff need not prove a specific defect
because a defective product determination may arise from an evalu-
ation of all the variables in a given case. 8 Apart from the mere
burden of proving the existence of the defect, the plaintiff in a
negligence action must also allege the defective conditions resulting
in plaintiff's injury. In a recent case, 9 for instance, a university
student was electrocuted when a model airplane he had purchased
came into contact with a primary power line causing electricity to
course through the aircraft's control wires, resulting in the youth's
death. The complaint in the wrongful death action alleged that the
components sold to decedent in their sealed cartons were defectively
manufactured. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that
plaintiff's failure to identify specifically the defects rendered the
complaint incapable of stating a cause of action. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the ruling of the
trial court.
Oftentimes, plaintiff's burden will not lie solely in framing an
artful complaint in order to present evidence to the finder of fact,
but will instead center on the type of evidence required to meet his
burden of proof. In an action sounding in both negligence and im-
plied warranty, a plaintiff, injured by particles of glass which
pierced her eye when a soda bottle exploded, relied on the doctrine
16. 23 FLA. JuR. Negligence § 2 (1959) (citing DeWald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919 (Fla.
1952)).
17. See, e.g., Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert.
denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
18. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
Tx. L. REv. 1185, 1206-08 (1976); see also Armor Elevator Co. v. Wood, 312 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
3d DCA), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1975) (action for breach of implied warranty of
fitness).
19. Rice v. Walker, 359 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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of res ipsa loquitur when it was impossible to demonstrate affirma-
tively that no intervening force had affected the condition of the
bottle since it left the control of the manufacturer." The appellate
court was called upon to determine whether the trial court had
properly granted appellee's motion for a directed verdict. As the
court stated, "[tihe answer to that question depends upon whether
or not appellant adduced sufficient evidence during the presenta-
tion of her case to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."' The
appellate court, relying on earlier "bottle cases," determined that
sufficient evidence to invoke the doctrine had been presented if "on
the whole it is more likely that there was negligence associated with
the cause of the exploding bottle than there was not."2 The effect
of the invocation of res ipsa loquitur is therefore twofold; it will get
the plaintiffs safely by a motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict, and it will establish a prima facie case.23
The utility of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not limitless,
however. In Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis," the trial court
instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur in an action involving a
death allegedly occurring due to the failure of a tire on decedent's
automobile. One of plaintiff's experts had testified that the blowout
was the result of burned polyester cords in the tire body, which had
to have occurred during the manufacturing process. Conflicting evi-
dence indicated that such a condition might not have been responsi-
ble for the failure of the tire, and at any rate, several alternative
causes, including the negligence of the operator of the vehicle in
properly maintaining the tire, were raised by competent evidence.
The majority, although faced with a formidable dissent on this
point, held that although res ipsa loquitur does not generally apply
to tire failure cases, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to
allow a jury properly to apply the doctrine if it should so choose and,
therefore, the instruction was properly given by the trial court. 5
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida consolidated
Dayton Tire with another case,2" almost identical on its facts, to
consider the propriety of the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine by
20. Steele v. Royal Crown Cola Bottling Co., 335 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert.
denied, 345 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1977).
21. Id. at 588.
22. Id.
23. See also Groves v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949).
24. 348 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
25. Id. at 586.
26. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply Inc., 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA
1976).
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the respective district courts of appeal. 7 The court found fault with
the majority opinions of both of the district courts, believing that
the lower courts had attenuated the traditional res ipsa doctrine by
allowing its application where there had been no showing of the
manufacturers' exclusive control and where the facts surrounding
the occurrence were discoverable and provable.28 The court felt that
once the tire had left the control of the manufacturer and had been
put into service, res ipsa was inappropriate. This holding seems
incongruous, especially in view of the clearly analogous series of
"exploding bottle cases,"2 which allowed a res ipsa charge solely on
proof that nothing unusual had occurred to the bottles in transit
from. manufacturer to injured consumer. The retention of res ipsa
in products liability actions in such a limited guise is somewhat
inconsistent with the supreme court's recent trend toward liberali-
zation of remedies in the consumer-oriented development of the law.
In essence, the court is establishing a doctrine of res ipsa applicable
only by reference to a time-based standard: the time since purchase
or use of the product prevents application of the doctrine. This is a
far cry from the traditional application of the doctrine which con-
templated "a common sense inference of negligence where direct
proof of negligence is wanting, provided certain elements consistent
with negligent behavior are present. ' 3 Merely quantifying the va-
lidity of the rule by a'time-based standard ignores the reality under-
lying the rule-that certain occurrences are, in the fullness of
human experience, unlikely to occur without some contributing
fault. Moreover, there may be circumstances where the existence of
some direct proof is not destructive of the availability of this com-
mon sense inference.
Since res ipsa loquitur, for the most part, only gets the plaintiff
to the jury, the existence of some direct proof along with a res ipsa
charge is unlikely to dictate results always favorable to the plaintiff.
If the lower courts have extended the use of the doctrine, it may be
due solely to their recognition that juries inevitably apply a personal
res ipsa doctrine regardless of the jury instructions. If, for instance,
in general experience, tires with low mileage do not malfunction,
27. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978) (consolidated by
order of the court).
28. Id. at 1342-43.
29. Id. at 1343 n.9. The court evidently felt that certain limited circumstances can justify
retention of the doctrine. The "exploding bottle cases" and the case of Yarborough v. Ball
U-Drive Sys., Inc., 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1950), mentioned in the court's footnote, apparently
are to be the limiting parameters for res ipsa in the products liability area.
30. Id. at 1341.
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then res ipsa loquitur-the accident does speak to the jury. In addi-
tion, a defendant is not really disadvantaged by the charge because
it is not conclusory in itself; it only becomes so in the absence of
proof adduced by the defendant that his product was safe. The
onerous burden of proving a defect and tying it to the conduct of
the manufacturer has no doubt eased the conscience of the courts
which have put such doctrines as res ipsa loquitur to good use when
the equities of a given case move them. After Dayton Tire, however,
its use will be severely circumscribed.
Judicial awareness of the heavy burden on plaintiff to prove his
case is evident in other areas as well. For instance, a court may
ameliorate plaintiff's burden of proof by allowing the admission of
evidence concerning a manufacturer's knowledge of a defective con-
dition as a result of prior occurrences involving the product. In Warn
Industries v. Geist,3 a winch operator was permitted to introduce
evidence regarding a previous accident with one of defendant-
manufacturer's winches. The court observed that admissibility in
such cases was usually limited to "the purpose of showing the dan-
gerous character of the instrumentality and defendant's knowledge
thereof.''32 This rationale apparently would allow the introduction
of evidence with proper instruction limiting it only to the questions
of the foreseeability of an injury and the knowledge reasonably to
be imputed to the manufacturer.
Allowing the admission into evidence of recall letters is another
way in which a court may ease plaintiff's burden of proof. In Harley-
Davidson Moto'r qo. v. Carpenter, 3 the plaintiff, injured in a motor-
cycle accident, brought a products liability action in negligence to
recover damages from the manufacturer. The trial court admitted
into evidence a recall letter which described a defect in the product
plaintiff had been operating, which was alleged to have been the
proximate cause of the injury. The appellate court said, "[e]ven
though the recall .letters were not admissible to show that the defect
discussed existed in the particular motorcycle owned by the plaintiff
or caused the accident, they were admissible to show that the defect
existed in the hands of the manufacturer. 3
As in the case of evidence of prior occurrences, the true effect
of such "limited" admissions is the subject of some conjecture. So
long as products liability actions are couched in negligence, the need
31. 343 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1977).
32. Id. at 46.
33. 350 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
34. Id. at 361.
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to prove a specific defect proximately related to the injury com-
plained of will militate towards stylized results. This promotes nei-
ther certainty in the law nor consistency in results from juries in-
structed to regard telling evidence for only limited purposes. This
artificiality should commend strict liability actions to both the
bench and the bar, as the relaxed burden of proving a proximate
defect should obviate much of the need to conjure up exceptions to
afford justice in a particular set of circumstances.
1. SECONDARY COLLISIONS: THE CRASHWORTHY DOCTRINE
The strict requirements of negligence actions, that the defect
be specifically proven and be a proximate cause of plaintiff's inju-
ries, have placed a heavy burden on Florida plaintiffs in "second
collision" litigation. A "second collision" case arises when the as-
serted defect was not a proximate cause of the initial collision, but
nevertheless caused or aggravated the occupants' injuries by sub-
jecting them to secondary impacts. The Supreme Court of Florida
passed on the issue of negligent design and manufacture in second-
ary collisions in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho. 35 The certi-
fied question before the court was "whether a manufacturer of auto-
mobiles may be liable to a user of the automobile for a defect in
manufacture which causes injury to the user when the injury occurs
as a result of a collision and the defect did not cause the collision? 3
The court examined the two leading cases on this question, Evans
v. General Motors Corp." and Larsen v. General Motors Corp. ", In
Evans, a broadside collision had resulted in severe injuries which
plaintiff asserted would have been substantially avioided by a more
adequately designed frame. The majority in Evans concluded that
despite a manufacturer's knowledge of the likelihood of collisions,
no duty arose to ensure that the vehicle was accident-proof or fool-
proof. So long as engaging in collisions was not the lawful, intended
purpose of the vehicle, the manufacturer was exonerated. 9 The ra-
tionale of the Evans decision became the basis for similar opinions
in" a number of jurisdictions. In deciding Larsen, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took a con-
trary position on the manufacturer's duty. The decedent in Larsen
35. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
36. Id. at 202.
37. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
38. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
39. 359 F.2d at 825.
40. These decisions were collected by the Supreme Court of Florida in Ford Motor Corp.
v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201, 203 n.2 (Fla. 1976).
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was impaled by the steering shaft, which was driven aft by a head-
on collision. The court found the rationale of Evans unpersuasive,
reasoning that the function and intended use of automobiles is to
provide a means of transportation as safe as is reasonably possible
in light of the state of the art." The court stated: "This duty of
reasonable care in design rests on common law negligence that a
manufacturer of an article should use reasonable care in the design
and manufacture of his product to eliminate any unreasonable risk
of foreseeable injury."' 2 The Larsen ruling became the more widely
accepted view in the following years. 3
The Supreme Court of Florida in Evancho adopted the Larsen
standard and answered the certified question in the affirmative. In
Florida, the manufacturer is liable not only for injuries caused by
the intended use of the product, but also for those injuries caused
by an unintended but foreseeable use, e.g., secondary collisions.
This result is in accordance with the usual standard, that a manu-
facturer's liability for negligence is governed by the foreseeability of
the harm. The utility of the Evancho decision, however, is limited
by the difficulties of proof in a negligence action.
The requirement of foreseeability may forestall a judgment
holding a manufacturer liable for injuries from secondary impacts
caused by a defect in the design of a product. A case in point is
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Apeco Corp." Plaintiff was injured when
the steering mechanism of a pleasure boat failed. He sued both the
supplier of the mechanism and the manufacturer of the craft. The
plaintiff's evidence tended to establish that the only proximate
cause of his injury was the engine defect. The supplier, on its
crossclaim for indemnification against the manufacturer, tried to
prove that the negligent design of the safety rails on the boat was
in part responsible for plaintiff's injuries. Despite expert testimony
to this effect, the trial court ruled that a jury question was not raised
with regard to the adequacy of the design as a contributing cause
of the injury.'" The essence of the ruling was that the supplier had
failed to demonstrate the foreseeability of the injury resulting from
the combination of the design defect and the malfunction of the
engine."
41. 391 F.2d at 503.
42. Id. (footnote omitted).
43. Decisions imposing this greater duty on manufacturers were collected by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Evancho, 327 So. 2d at 203 n.3.
44. 348 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6.
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Although foreseeability has always been a potential bar to re-
covery in a negligence action, its influence in the secondary collision
area is likely to be particularly important. The foreseeability stan-
dard, within the experience of the trier of fact, will provide the
necessary safeguards and limitations on the secondary collision ac-
tion, so that it does not become merely a means of reaching an
additional solvent defendant.
2. THE DUTY TO WARN UNDER A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
Florida case law delineates two conditions under which a manu-
facturer has a clear duty to provide potential consumers with fair
and adequate warnings regarding possible dangers associated with
the use of its products: where products are deemed inherently dan-
gerous;47 and where products, although not inherently dangerous,
could foreseeably cause injury if defective in manufacture or design.
If a plaintiff is able to prove that the product responsible for
his injury comes within the inherently dangerous classification, then
he will be relieved of the burden of proving that his injury was of a
type foreseeable by the manufacturer. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, rebuffed such an attempt in Dayton Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Davis,"5 where the trial court, in its charge to the jury, had
brought an automobile tire under the rule governing inherently dan-
gerous products. The appellate court found the charge to constitute
reversible error in that no reasonable person could find an automo-
bile tire to be dangerous in and of itself. Stating that "[w]hen used
in its ordinary and intended fashion, a tire presents no danger what-
soever,"" the court took note of Odum v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., "
in which a federal district court in Florida expressly found a tire not
to be within the category of products classified as inherently danger-
ous. The First District observed that if the charge had been upheld,
a jury would be required to find a tire manufacturer negligent if the
jury found a failure to inspect and warn even if such failure did not
constitute negligence. 5'
47. "[I]n order to properly label a commodity inherently dangerous, it must be danger-
ous in and of itself. The fact that it becomes dangerous due to a defect does not necessarily
make the product an inherently dangerous commodity requiring the strict duty of care."
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis, 348 So. 2d 575, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 582.
50. 196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
51. 348 So. 2d at 582. The Supreme Court of Florida discussed the manufacturer's duty
to warn in the context of inherently dangerous products in Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.
2d 603 (Fla. 1958). In that case, the decedent's death was caused by the inhalation of carbon
tetrachloride vapors while he was cleaning his home. Noting that the product was not defec-
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The court in Dayton went on to establish a standard for mea-
suring the liability of a manufacturer of a product not inherently
dangerous for failure to warn consumers of possible dangers asso-
ciated with the use of that product. The court stated: "Whether or
not the manufacturer or retailer should have warned the consumer
of a product's dangerous propensities is a question for the jury based
upon the manufacturer's foreseeability of injury to the consumer."5
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant
knew or should have known of an alleged defect which proximately
caused plaintiff's injury and that the defendant negligently failed
to provide adequate warning."3 To sustain a claim for damages pred-
icated on a failure to warn of an alleged defect in product design,
the evidence must demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge
of the condition.Y
It might appear that manufacturers could easily insulate them-
selves from liability for failure to warn consumers of the dangerous
propensities of their products by merely appending a catchall warn-
ing to the item. Properly phrased, such a warning might even avoid
liability as a result of a defect the manufacturer should have had
knowledge of, but which, in fact, had escaped his attention. Such a
facile solution, however, would probably be ineffective in most cases
because a mere warning is insufficient to render the manufacturer
blameless. To be an effective protective device, even under the com-
parative negligence system of Hoffman v. Jones, 55 the warning must
adequately inform the user of the type of care he must exercise to
minimize potential danger of use or misuse of the product. 5
tive but was by its nature dangerous, the court stated that "with regard to this type of article
the liability of a manufacturer or distributor is predicated on a failure to give adequate
warning of the inherent danger." Id. at 608. This requirement that a manufacturer provide
adequate warnings on inherently dangerous products has been followed in subsequent cases
and applied to a variety of products. E.g., Edwards v. California Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259
(Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1971) (explosives); Lake v. Konstantinu,
189 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (pharmaceuticals).
52. 348 So. 2d at 582.
53. See Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 322 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963) (manufacturer
not required to warn of danger it had no reason to foresee, there having been no malfunctions
in numerous machines sold previously). See also L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, §
8.
54. Thus, an importer who distributed foreign built automobiles containing alleged de-
sign defects would be entitled to summary judgment when no evidence appears of record "to
support the knowledge of [the] defendant of the alleged design defect." Skinner v. Volkswa-
gon of America, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
55. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The Supreme Court of Florida replaced the contributory
negligence rule with the comparative negligence doctrine and established standards for the
application of comparative negligence.
56. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis, 348 So. 2d 575, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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In determining the adequacy of a warning, the trier of fact may
look to a variety of factors, including the character of the plaintiff
and the special knowledge he may possess. Thus, in Wickham v.
Baltimore Copper Paint Co., 57 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that a professional painter and his employer could not
successfully plead the inadequacy of a warning label on a can of
paint as a basis for recovery when the warning admonished the user
against inhalation of the vapors or spray mist and recommended
that the product not be used absent adequate ventilation. The in-
jury in Wickham occurred despite plaintiff-employee's use of a
mask to avoid inhalation of fumes. The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff had read the warning and used the safety device, the
adequacy of the warning was not a material issue, as "both the
employer and employee user of the commercial product were cogni-
zant of the dangers involved.""8
The adequacy of a warning label can be a material issue, how-
ever, when the injury occurs, under circumstances casting doubt on
the efficacy of the warning in alerting a user to the sort of hazard
to which he might be exposed. In Mathis v. National Laboratories,5"
a school employee wore rubber gloves while using a cleaning solvent
supplied by her employer. The product contained concentrated car-
boloic acid which, despite the gloves, turned the black woman's
hands white, a condition known as hypopigmentation. The suit al-
leged that the manufacturer of the solvent was negligent in failing
to warn on its label that dilution of the product was required. The
trial court, relying on Wickham, entered final summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. The District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, distinguished its earlier decision in Wickham because there,
both the injured party and his employer read and understood the
warning label on the product and actually took precautions
against the known danger involved with the product's use. Unlike
the facts sub judice, the alleged inadequacy of the label in
Wickham was not the proximate cause of .the damages sus-
tained. 0
Summary judgment was deemed inappropriate, as "issues dealing
with the adequacy of a warning and instruction on a product's label
are questions of fact, not law."'
57. 327 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
58. Id. at 827.
59. 355 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
60. Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
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Under Florida law, the duty of a manufacturer to give warning
against dangerous propensities of his product is absolute if the prod-
uct is one deemed to be inherently dangerous in its intended state.
If the product is not inherently dangerous but may, due to its condi-
tion, pose a foreseeable threat of injury to the user or consumer, an
adequate warning will be required. To constitute an adequate warn-
ing, the manufacturer must ensure that the warning effectively in-
structs potential users against the danger the product may pose.
Whether the warning is adequate is a question for the trier of fact
when the evidence indicates that the failure to warn was a proxi-
mate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff.
B. Implied Warranties
The second traditional theory of recovery in products liability
cases is that of breach of implied warranty."2 Two significant divi-
sions exist within the purview of products liability suits under war-
ranty: common law implied warranty and implied warranty gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code. 3
1. COMMON LAW IMPLIED WARRANTY64
The elements of a cause of action under common law implied
warranty have been variously stated by the courts. In general, four
primary characteristics are recognized as essential to any recovery.
As the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, stated in Sansing
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. :6"
Liability is imposed under the theory of implied warranty when
it has been proved that: (1) Plaintiff was a foreseeable user of the
product; (2) The product was being used in the intended manner
at the time of the injury; (3) The product was defective when
transferred from the warrantor; and (4) The defect caused the
injury."6
Originally, an action based on an implied warranty theory was
62. Breach of an express warranty will, of course, also give rise to a cause of action. The
express warranty action, however, has been firmly fixed within contract law'and is subject
almost exclusively to the dictates of that branch of jurisprudence, instead of paralleling the
metamorphosis of the implied warranty action into a tort remedy with only vestigial connec-
tions to the contract field.
63. FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314-.315 & .318 (1977).
64. For an extensive development of the historical underpinnings of implied warranty
in Florida, see Ausness, From Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: A Review of Products
Liability in Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 410 (1972).
65. 354 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
66. Id. at 896 (citing McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
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grounded in contract law in a manner analogous to an express war-
ranty action. 7 Contract principles limited recovery until the privity
requirement was struck down regarding both inherently dangerous
products" and defective products which are neither reasonably safe
nor fit for their intended use."
The contractual overtones of an implied warranty action have
not been completely obliterated, however, since the Florida courts
have extended liability only to manufacturers and not to retailers
of a defectively designed or manufactured product.70 The hardship
which may be posed to a plaintiff when recovery against the retailer
is denied is not easily rationalized when the sole barrier to such
recovery is the privity requirement.7 If the product is in fact unrea-
sonably dangerous, it might be more appropriate simply to allow the
67. The contractual nature of the action began to recede as courts became accustomed
to imposing liability on the basis of a determination of the existence of an implied warranty
as a matter of law independent of any action of the parties to the particular transaction. E.g.,
Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953). See also 28 FLA.'JUR. Sales § 134
(1968).
68. Recovery of damages by one not in privity with the manufacturer had been barred
at common law, thereby effectively preventing an action on an implied warranty theory. In
Mathews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956), the Supreme Court of Florida held that
recovery in a products liability case could be founded on implied warranty even in the absence
of privity when the product involved was inherently dangerous.
69. The privity requirement was abrogated completely in Bernstein v. Lilly-Tulip Cup
Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), aff'd, 181 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1966). The court held
that privity was no longer required in an action against a manufacturer even when the product
was not inherently dangerous, The defendant-manufacturer could be held liable to an appro-
priate user on an implied warranty theory for a product or product design found to be
defective or not reasonably safe or fit for its intended purpose at the time it left the control
of the manufacturer. See THE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION, FLORIDA
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS pt. IV-PL, at 1-2 (1975) (implied warranty). See also Marrilla
v. Lynn Craft Boat Co., 271 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Barfield v. U.S. Rubber Co., 234
So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
70. E.g., Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961); cf. Toombs v. Fort
Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968) (dangerous instrumentality exception to the privity
requirement in action against retailers). For a discussion of the abrogation of the privity
requirement in suits against manufacturers of defective products, see note 69 supra.
The likelihood of holding a retailer liable increases dramatically, however, if the retailer
represents to a consumer that the product is his own. The considerations behind this rule are
clearly concerned with the expectations of the consumer. For representative authority, see
Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 233 F.2d
267 (5th Cir. 1963); Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Marris, 136 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1962).
The majority of jurisdictions, following the lead of California in Chief Justice Traynor's
opinion in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(Cal. 1964), holds retailers liable for harm to consumers due to the retailer's essential position
in the manufacturing-marketing enterprise and his potential ability, to ensure the safety of
the product or to put pressure on the manufacturer toward that end. See, e.g., LaGorga v.
Kroger Co. 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Wachtel v. Rosel, 271 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1970)
Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
71. See Ausness, supra note 64.
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action against the retailer, thereby recognizing in the commercial
setting his right of indemnification or contribution from the manu-
facturer. This approach would be more consistent with the general
rationale of implied warranty actions, where the seller's actual or
constructive knowledge of the defect is immaterial to the question
of liability." The impact of the restriction imposed by the privity
requirement in an implied warranty action has been minimized
greatly with the advent of the strict liability action in Florida. The
contractual problems inherent in an implied warranty are alleviated
by the use of the strict liability theory,73 without placing on the
plaintiff the often onerous burden of proof required in a negligence
action.7"
2. IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
With the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in
Florida," there was some concern by the trial bar that the UCC
would subsume and ultimately extinguish the common law action
in implied warranty. Not only did this dire prediction not occur,"
but, rather, the implied warranty cause of action has been extended
to the sale of used goods.
Traditionally, *a products liability action for injury caused by
secondhand or used goods was a disfavored cause of action regard-
less of the theory relied upon. Implied warranties did not run to used
72. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
73. Under the strict liability standard, plaintiff is relieved of the contractual problems
of privity, notice, waiver and disclaimer.
74. See notes 16-61 and accompanying text supra.
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314-.315 & -.318 (1977).
76. The District Court of Appeal, First District, clearly stated that the doctrine of im-
plied warranty survived the enactment of the UCC: "Unless the legislature has in unequivocal
terms spelled out to the courts of the State that it has by the enactment of the omnibus
Uniform Commercial Code severed the implied warranty doctrine from the jurisprudence of
the State, we will not be the operator of the guillotine." Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.
2d 246, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
The enactment of the UCC served to codify preexisting law in Florida which had centered
around application of the concepts of merchantability, the fitness of a product for the normal
uses to which a commodity is customarily put, and fitness for a particular purpose, a standard
presupposing the seller's knowledge of the ultimate intended use of the product by the partic-
ular consumer. Both concepts seek to limit to some degree the liability of a seller for injuries
caused by unforeseeable uses which he should not reasonably be required to protect against.
E.g., Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Brown v. Hand, 221 So. 2d
454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Arcade Steam Laundry v. Bass, 159 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
Enactment of the UCC did, however, make significant changes in preexisting Florida law
with respect to third party beneficiaries of both types of implied warranties. Section 672.318
of the Florida Statutes (1977) extended the seller's warranty to both members and guests of
the buyer's household and to employees of the buyer who may reasonably be expected to be
affected by the condition of the goods.
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goods in Florida. 7 In Knipp v. Weinbaum,75 however, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that under certain circumstan-
ces, implied warranties could extend to used goods. In Knipp,
plaintiff purchased a secondhand motorcycle. Several hours after
the sale, a defective weld collapsed, injurying the plaintiff. The bill
of sale included an "as is" disclaimer. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment, and plaintiff appealed from the adverse ruling,
alleging that the count in implied warranty raised a material issue
of fact as to the effect the parties intended the "as is" clause to have.
Before agreeing with the plaintiff, the appellate court examined the
law existing before and after the adoption of the UCC in Florida,
finding that "the law does imply warranties in this sale of used
merchandise.""
The court in Knipp also closely examined the apparent elimi-
nation of any warranty by virtue of the "as is" clause and section
672.316(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which states: "Unless the cir-
cumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty."' 8' By restrictively interpreting this provision, the court found
that the phrase "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise" pre-
cludes "automatic absolution" from liability.2 While a seller may
prevent warranties from attaching to used goods by such language,
the efficacy of the attempt will, under the Knipp rule, become a
question of fact requiring evidence as to the circimstances sur-
rounding the transaction.
3. THE DEMISE OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
As is evident from a review of case law after the advent of strict
liability in Florida, claims sounding in implied warranty are becom-
77. See Tampa Ship Bldg. Co. v. General Constr. Co., 43 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1930);
Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); U.S. Rubber Prods. v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631,
200 So. 385 (1941).
78. 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
79. It should be noted that actions in implied warranty on used goods, although open to
criticism, are likely to survive since, although strict liability has tended to replace implied
warranty generally, the law of strict liability with respect to used goods is unsettled. Id. at
1086.
For a full and critical discussion of Knipp, and of a similar case involving used aircraft,
Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), see Murray, Commercial Law, 1978
Developments in Florida Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 853, 859-60 & nn.24 & 26 (1979).
80. 351 So. 2d at 1085.
81. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(3)(a) (1977).
82. 351 So. 2d at 1084.
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ing a rarity. Just as implied warranty altered the scope of products
liability by removing the onus of proving actual or constructive
knowledge of the defect-so essential to a successful negligence
count-strict liability relaxed the burden on plaintiff by expanding
the protection to bystanders 83 and alleviating the problems of no-
tice, disclaimers and privity which had made recovery difficult in
implied warranty actions.
The standards applied to determine whether a product is mer-
chantable under implied warranty8 are similar to the criteria uti-
lized in determining whether a product is in an unreasonably dan-
gerous defective condition, the standard under strict liability. For
all practical purposes, Florida has eliminated any privity or con-
tract concepts in implied warranties of merchantability.85 In es-
sence, a manufacturer who produces a defective product which is
not reasonably safe for its intended use is responsible for injury
caused by the defect .8 So, the two theories have become quite com-
parable. In Sansing v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 7 for instance,
plaintiffs were injured by the explosion of a tire and sought recovery
in negligence, breach of implied warranty and strict liability in tort.
The trial court struck the strict liability count and charged the jury
only with respect to the warranty theory of recovery. Assignment of
error was predicated on, inter alia, this refusal to allow the strict
liability theory to go to the jury. The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, determined, after a comparison of the elements of
strict liability and of implied warranty, that the standards of safety
imposed by the two theories were practically indistinguishable. 8
Thus, the court determined that when the trial court instructed the
jury on the warranty count, "from the totality of the instructions
given, the trial court, although having struck the claim for strict
liability, did in fact substantially instruct on strict liability. The
two theories . . . have become so intertwined that the distinction
. . .has no practical significance. ' 88 When, as in Sansing, one stan-
dard on which recovery is founded so totally absorbs another that a
charge on either is sufficient to guide a jury to a just result, it seems
83. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
84. The UCC suggests six standards for merchantability. FLA. STAT. § 672.314(2) (1977).
85. See 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 398, 403-07 (1977).
86. Compare Vandercook & Sons, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965), rehearing
denied, 395 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968) and McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 709 (Fla.
2d DCA 1974) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
87. 354 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
88. Id. at 896.
89. Id. at 897.
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unlikely that the growth of the law will long permit the subsumed
doctrine to exist.'0
C. Strict Liability
An addition to the traditional negligence and implied warranty
theories of recovery, strict liability emerged from the seminal case
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts."2 It was heralded as a totally distinct theory of
recovery which allowed plaintiff to sidestep the doctrinal hurdles of
negligence" and implied warranty." The historical background from
which the doctrine emerged and the national impact of strict liabil-
ity have been extensively and adequately dealt with elsewhere.'
Still, a brief outline of the elements, as well as the impact of the
doctrine in Florida, is in order.'"
1. WHAT IS STRICT LIABILITY?
Strict liability is a rule under which liability may be imposed
upon a manufacturer of a product regardless of negligence or the
failure to exercise reasonable care. 7 Considerations of fault, due
care and negligence are inapplicable. The plaintiff need not prove
specific acts of negligence, as he would if pleading solely under
negligence, and this substantially lessens the burden of proof under
strict liability." The standards of liability, as well as its limits, are
clearly delineated in section 402A of the Restatement:
1 7-;
90. Although this decision suggests that the implied warranty attion is absorbing the
strict liability action, the authors of this article suggest that the wider scope of the strict
liability doctrine will cause the reverse to obtain.
91. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
93. For instance, in negligence actions, the plaintiff is required to prove a specific defect
or act of negligence. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 4-46 and
accompanying text supra.
94. For instance, in an implied warranty action, the plaintiff must surmount the obsta-
cles of notice requirements, disclaimers and privity. For a discussion of the privity aspects,
see notes 67-74 and accompanying text supra.
95. E.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
96. Strict liability, as delineated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, was
expressly adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336
So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). For a discussion of this landmark decision, see Murray, 1976 Develop-
ments in Florida Law-Commercial Law, 31 U. MAMi L. REv. 895, 898-99 (1977); 29 U. FLA.
L. REV. 398 (1977).
97. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973).
98. See Green, supra note 18, at 1207; 4 W. ST. U.L. REV. 283, 286 (1977).
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold."
The section specifies that strict liability is imposed for reasons out-
side the traditional negligence and warranty theories:
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relationship with
the seller.00
The phrase "all possible care" in subsection (a) negates application
of negligence principles, while subsection (b) expressly excludes
warranty considerations. I10
Public policy considerations gave birth to the new doctrine. The
major policies distinguished by the courts and commentators are:
(1) that the manufacturer is in a better position to protect against
harm through improvement of the product; (2) that the risk of loss
should not fall upon an innocent party, but should be spread among
all consumers by-an increase in the manufacturer's prices; (3) that
the manufacturer is in a better position to insure against liability;
(4) that the manufacturer should stand behind his product, and
that he impliedly represents that it is. reasonably fit for use when
he places it in the stream of trade; and (5) that by holding the
manufacturer to a higher standard, there will be a continual upgrad-
ing in the safety of products.'"2 In sum, the policies indicate a man-
date away from emphasis on fault to a risk-shifting policy based
upon "enterprise liability."' 13 The potential risk of loss due to an
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(I) (1965).
100. Id. § 402A(2) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 402A, Comment a. The courts have recognized the independence of strict
liability from negligence and warranty. Smith v. Fiat Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728,
730 (5th Cir. 1977); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
102. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965); Green, supra
note 18, at 1190-91; Wade, supra note 97, at 826.
103. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976).
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unreasonably dangerous defect in products liability cases is to be
seen as a risk of doing business in the modern commercial world,
and strict liability is the outgrowth of this philosophical change.
Under strict liability, however, the manufacturer is not to be
viewed as an insurer. I'0 The limitations on such liability are pro-
vided by section 402A of the Restatement: (1) the defendant must
be engaged in the business of selling the product; (2) the product
must be shown to be "defective"; (3) the defective condition must
render the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the defect must
be a cause of plaintiffs injury. 05 Consequently, although an auto-
mobile can cause injury, the manufacturer is liable only if the auto-
mobile is defective in some way that makes it unreasonably danger-
ous. 
106
Strict liability under section 402A was adopted in Florida by
the supreme court in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.' 07 The court
outlined the above elements for holding a manufacturer liable, with
one exception. Rather than merely stating that the defect must
"cause" the injury, the court held that the existence of a "proximate
causal connection" between the defect and injury must be shown.
The authors suggest that the supreme court either misconstrued the
doctrine entirely or poorly phrased this aspect of the elements of
strict liability.' 8 Proximate causation is a concept peculiarly applic-
able to negligence and should not enter into a strict liability analy-
sis. Proximate cause "isapplied by the courts to those more or less
undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact
104. Wade, supra note 97, at 828.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(1) (1965).
106. Thus, if the owner left a vehicle standing without putting on a handbrake and the
vehicle rolled into plaintiff, plaintiff could not hold the manufacturer liable. The product was
not in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition. If the owner, however, had just pur-
chased a new car and had put on the handbrake, but the vehicle injured plaintiff due to a
defective part that allowed the brake to release, then strict liability could be applicable.
107. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); see note 96 supra.
108. The present confusion among Florida district courts about strict liability may be
attributable to the decision of the supreme court in West. The opinion is unclear about what
exactly is being implemented under the strict liability label. The court stated that strict
liability, as delineated by § 402A of the Restatement, is adopted in Florida. 336 So. 2d at 87.
Later in the opinion, however, the court cited to the leading California case on strict liability,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
336 So. 2d at 89. The California rule that developed from Greenman does not require, as does
§ 402A, that the defect be unreasonably dangerous for liability to be imposed. The issue is
further clouded by the definition of strict liability provided in West: "Strict liability means
negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se, the effect of which is to remove the burden
from the user of proving specific acts of negligence." 336 So. 2d at 90. Under § 402A, however,
strict liability is not considered a type of negligence and the manufacturer can be held liable
regardless of the amount of due care exercised.
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of causation is clearly established. ""' The Restatement uses only
the phrase "harm thereby caused"; the omission of "proximate"
would seem to indicate that under strict liability, "cause-in-fact,"
not proximate cause, should be the governing consideration.""
The use of proximate cause can best be seen as a reflex reac-
tion-a verbal crutch whose familiarity breeds contempt for ra-
tional analysis. One can speculate that the reason why proximate
cause has surfaced in products liability cases is the courts' fear
that, without proximate cause, manufacturers will be insurers of
their products. Courts are, therefore, faced with the perplexing
problem of limiting a section 402A action so that it does not
become coextensive with insurance."'
The inclusion of proximate causation in strict liability analysis
in West creates difficulties for the development of the doctrine in
Florida. The courts must establish the meaning proximate cause
shall have in the strict liability context. The strict liability rule
needs the causation concept in order to determine when a manufac-
turer should no longer be liable for harm caused by a defect which
is unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the authors suggest that
proximate cause should be defined as a standard for determining
that plaintiff's injury was in fact caused by and was a foreseeable
consequence of the defect. This would assuage the fear that without
proximate cause manufacturers would be insurers of their products.
It would also prevent courts from using proximate cause to bar
recovery when, in essence, they are really applying contributory
109. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
110. For a persuasive discussion decrying the use of proximate cause terminology in strict
liability analysis, see Maleson, Negligence is Dead But Its Doctrines Rule Us From The
Grave: A Proposal to Limit Defendant's Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions
Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1978).
111. Id. at 16 (citations omitted). The author offers a "duty-risk analysis" solution to
the problem. Under this standard, the judge would formulate the duty of the defendant and
then decide the scope of the risk that should be encompassed within that duty. Id. at 17-20;
see, e.g., Hishchoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 155 (1972)
(advocating an economic approach). The authors herein contend that proximate cause, as
well as comparative negligence, may not be the appropriate answer to the problem of limiting
a manufacturer's liability because of the overtones of negligence law in the doctrines. Rather,
they advocate a balancing test. See text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
That negligence law may be easily, if inappropriately, incorporated into strict liability
analysis is apparent from decisions of the lower courts. For instance, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, has held that under strict liability, proof of a subsequent improvement
in a product "is not an evidentiary fact ipso facto to infer negligence in the manufacture of
the original product." Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
The inquiry, however, should not be whether there was negligence in the manufacture of the
product, since § 402A states that liability is imposed regardless of due care. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
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negligence as an absolute bar to recovery." 2
The influx of negligence principles into strict liability resulting
from the language of the West"' opinion causes misdirection of
strict liability analysis." ' In keeping with the policies behind the
strict liability doctrine,"5 inquiries should be limited to whether the
product was defective and whether the defect caused injury to the
plaintiff. Questions concerning the plaintiff's conduct should not be
addressed in the context of causation, but only after liability has
been determined.1"0
2. STRICT LIABILITY OF RETAILERS
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts establishes
that strict liability applies to those "engaged in the business of
selling such a product.""' 7 Comment f to this section further defines
the class of defendants as extending "to any manufacturer of such
a product, to any wholesaler or retail dealer or distributor, and to
the operator of a restaurant.""' In West, the Supreme Court of
Florida, in adopting strict liability, held that the rule applies to
manufacturers."' Subsequently, the Florida courts implicitly ex-
tended the scope of liability to include retailers.'
Of course, a retailer always has recourse against the manufac-
turer for indemnification. In Pender v. Skilicraft Industries, Inc., 12
112. The Supreme Court of Florida has abrogated contributory negligence and adopted
comparative negligence, confining questions of plaintiff's conduct to the area of damages. See
note 55 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, recently held that a plaintiff
could not recover when his conduct was the sole cause of the accident. Watson v. Lucerne
Mach. & Equip. Co., 347 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Such language is inappropriate
within the strictures of products liability and comparative negligence. Plaintiff's conduct is
no longer the determinative inquiry under strict liability and should be relevant only in
apportioning damages if the product is found to be defective. Although the Second District
did find that the product was not defective, the holding should have been based solely on
this determination.
113. For a discussion of the problems this infusion of negligence principles has caused
in the area of defenses, see notes 142-208 and accompanying text infra.
114. See note 112 supra.
115. See notes 101-02 and accompanying text supra.
116. See note 112 supra.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) (1965).
118. Id. Comment f.
119. 336 So. 2d at 92.
120. E.g., Rice v. Walker, 359 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (allowing amendment of
complaint which failed to state cuase of action in strict liability against retailer because it
lacked allegations showing how components were defective); Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So.
2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (allowing amendment of complaint to include cause of action in
strict liability against retailer).
121. 357 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, extended the applica-
bility of indemnification to strict liability cases. A retailer is entitled
to indemnification if the defect in the product is latent and the
retailer had no knowledge nor should have known of such defect. 22
Normally, however, a retailer may be reimbursed for his costs of
litigation only if he is found liable under the primary action and
entitled to indemnification by the manufacturer. If the retailer is
found not liable, he must bear the costs of litigation. The Fourth
District, finding no justification for this result, determined that
even if the retailer is exonerated of all liability in the primary ac-
tion, he is still entitled to indemnification for court costs and attor-
ney's fees.
3. STRICr LIABILITY AND USED GOODS
The relationship between used merchandise and strict liability
is complex. Although Florida courts have imposed liability under
negligence's and implied warranty 12' theories for injuries resulting
from used goods sold by the defendant, the applicability of strict
liability 25 raises different considerations because it places liability
on one outside of the original manufacturing and marketing chain.
The expectations of the parties become relevant. A consumer ex-
pects a new product to be reasonably safe. Purchase of a used prod-
uct, however, is usually at a reduced price, reflecting the lower
expectations of the buyer. Not only may the product be "expected"
to malfunction, but also problems of proof may be compounded, as
there may be no way to trace the defect to a specific cause.
Nevertheless, there may be a strong argument for imposing
strict liability upon a seller of used products if that seller places an
unreasonably dangerous defective product in the stream of com-
merce. A case-by-case determination may be appropriate, with pri-
mary focus on whether the product was unreasonably dangerous.
The "reasonableness" would be determined by examination of all
factors. Public policy may demand such an approach in order to
ensure that safety standards, even for used merchandise, be kept
within acceptable limits.
122. Id. at 46. The passive wrongdoer is generally entitled to indemnification from the
active wrongdoer. W. PROSSER, supra note 109, at 312.
123. Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1085-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant because of disputed facts about degree of care).
124. Id. at 1084-85 (citing Brown v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)).
125. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that a plaintiff should be
permitted to amend his complaint to state a cause of action in strict liability against a seller
of used goods. Id. The court, however, did not reach the question of whether the doctrine of
strict liability should apply to used goods.
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4. THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY
The scope of protection afforded by strict liability was left open
in section 402A, which provides that the defendant is liable to the
"ultimate user or consumer." '126 West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,'27
however, settled the question for purposes of Florida law. The Su-
preme Court of Florida stated:
The public policy which protects the user and the consumer
of a manufactured article should also protect the innocent by-
stander. . . . Injury to a bystander is often feasible. A restriction
of the doctrine to the users and consumers would have to rest on
the vestige of the disappearing privity requirement." 8
This holding is in accordance with the policy foundation of strict
liability-that the seller should bear the risk of loss.'29 Therefore,
there is no rational justification for prohibiting parties other than a
user or consumer from suing for damages if it is foreseeable that the
product may cause injury or harm to these parties. 30
5. LIABILITY FOR DESIGN DEFECTS AND FAILURE TO WARN
A cause of action under strict liability for defective design is
directed to the whole line of products rather than to a specific item.
The question is not whether the particular product was defective
but whether the manufacturer should have marketed the product at
all. It is an attack on the manufacturer's conscious design choice
and should be governed by practical considerations concerning abil-
ity, cost and feasibility of eliminating the risk at the time of manu-
facture and the degree and likelihood of harm. In Florida, subse-
quent improvement in the design of a product is inadmissible in an
action based upon strict liability. 3' This inflexible rule seems inap-
propriate, since plaintiff may be able to show that the risk was
known and could have been economically eliminated at the time the
product entered the marketing stream.
The relationship between strict liability and the duty to warn
is set out by the comments to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Failure to give an adequate warning may render
126. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) (1965). See also id. Comment 1.
127. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
128. Id. at 89; accord, Watson v. Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So. 2d 459, 461 n.1
(Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
129. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 402A, Comment o (1965).
131. Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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a product defective.'32 In addition, an adequate warning may be
necessary to prevent a product from being unreasonably danger-
ous. u By the use of such a warning, a product otherwise unreasona-
bly dangerous may be rendered reasonably dangerous, thereby elim-
inating strict liability. 3' Consumer expectations are the key to the
necessity and adequacy of the warning. 3 5
The case law in Florida on warnings and defects in design in
the strict liability context is sparse. A recent decision of the District
Court of Appeal, First District, is particularly troublesome with
respect to defective design and failure to give adequate warning. In
Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 3 plaintiff's husband was killed while
removing a deteriorated inner lining from a heating chamber. The
lining could only be removed by an acetylene torch, which caused a
violent explosion due to combustible vapors remaining in the cham-
ber even after drainage. The First District held that there was no
design defect. The reasoning, however, is syllogistic due to a combi-
nation of the facts. The intended use of the heating chamber caused
combustible gases to collect and the maintenance of the chamber
required that the inner lining be removed by torch. Plaintiff alleged,
in addition, that the failure of the manufacturer to warn against the
danger was a sufficient ground to hold the manufacturer liable. The
court found the plaintiff's argument in this regard unpersuasive,
stating that "[t]o hold that every part subject to repair at a grave
risk must have a posted warning would result in an impossible and
even undesirable situation."' 37 Again, the logic is specious. The
warning that the manufacturer had given merely stated: "Remove
all oil from heater.' ' 3 The manufacturer, at a very small burden to
himself, could have included the phrase "by the use of steam" in
the warning instructions in order that the user might have made the
chamber safe by eliminating the combustible vapors which, when
ignited, caused the explosion. The authors of this article contend
that the court erred in its conclusion. Comment h to section 402A
of the Restatement states: "Where, however, [the manufacturer]
has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular
use. . . he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965).
133. Id. Comment j.
134. Wade, supra note 97, at 841-42. The adequacy of a warning is determined by "its
clarity, its prominence, whether it is attached to the product or is provided separately." Id.
at 842.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment j (1965).
136. 364 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
137. Id. at 1244-45.
138. Id.
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, * . and a product sold without such warning is in a defective
condition."'39 From the facts stated in Hethcoat, one could conclude
that the manufacturer had reason to anticipate the danger of the
explosion and that a jury question was presented as to the adequacy
of the warning and the possible defect in design.
At least one commentator 4 ' has concluded that failure to warn
and design defect cases belong solely within the confines of negli-
gence principles in that such determinations should be governed by
standards of negligence and foreseeability. Although there may be
merit to this approach, the Restatement provides support for in-
cluding these grounds within section 402A actions."'
III. DEFENSES TO A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION
A. Introduction
Regardless of the theory of recovery utilized, the plaintiff must
prove that defendant placed a defective product in the stream of
trade and that the defect caused injury to plaintiff. Absent proof of
such defect, the defendant is not liable. Regardless of the theory of
recovery upon which suit is based, a possible defense is that one of
the essential elements of the cause of action is missing. In a negli-
gence action,"' defendant could prove that no duty was owed to
plaintiff or that plaintiff's injury was not proximately caused by the
defect in the product. In an action for breach of implied warranty,
defendant could prove that plaintiff was a nonuser or nonconsumer
-merely 'a bystander-and thereby successfully defend.' 3 In a
strict liability case, however, defenses based upon the elements of
the action are not as readily available because strict liability is
premised solely on public policy considerations,' which result in a
reduced burden of proof for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, a defendant
may, as a defense, prove that there was no defect in the product or
that, even if there were a defect, it did not make the product unrea-
sonably dangerous."'
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORrs § 402A, Comment h (1965).
140. Maleson, supra note 110, at 26-27.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments h & j (1965).
142. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The traditional elements necessary for action-
able negligence are: (1) the existence of a legal duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury or damages. W. PROSER, supra
note 109, at 143.
143. E.g., Engel v. Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co., 198 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
144. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
145. The standard for strict liability is that the product be in "a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
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B. Affirmative Defenses
Certain longstanding defenses have barred plaintiffs from re-
covery in products liability cases even when the burden of proof
regarding the elements of the particular cause of action was met.
Contributory negligence, "' assumption of risk "7 and the "open and
obvious doctrine"" 8 served as vestigial barriers to recovery in Flor-
ida. Florida case law over the past several years, however, has
evinced a trend away from the absolute defenses represented by
these doctrines.
The growing national dissatisfaction with these absolute bars
to recovery"' appeared in Florida in a series of decisions50 which
uprooted the traditional barriers in favor of a simpler system revolv-
ing around the concept of comparative negligence. Many commen-
tators,'' however, disagree with the method of the courts in their
approach to defenses in products liability cases. They believe that
many courts are erroneously grouping the three theories of recovery,
allowing defenses, which should be applicable only to one theory, to
be utilized regardless of the theory of recovery. 2 That is, since the
elements of the cause of action and the burden of proof for both
plaintiff and defendant are distinct and different for each theory,
defenses having their foundation in negligence should not be applied
to a theory of recovery based on strict liability. As one commentator
observed:
Now that Section 402A has gained general acceptance and caveat
venditor seems to be the philosophy of the day, it would be rea-
sonable to expect that the painful doctrinal contortions of the
past century have been laid to rest. However, it is becoming
146. E.g., Coleman v. American Universal, Inc., 264 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
(contributory negligence available as defense in breach of implied warranty action). The
Supreme Court of Florida replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. See
note 54 supra.
147. E.g., Southern Turpentine Co. v. Douglass, 61 Fla. 424, 54 So. 385 (1911) (employee
assumes all risks necessarily incident to his employment).
148. E.g., Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (implied warranty does
not protect against hazards apparent to plaintiff).
149. See W. PROssER, supra note 109, at 433-34 (discussing contributory negligence doc-
trine).
150. E.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (abolished implied assumption
of risk as an absolute defense); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (abrogated
contributory negligence).
151. E.g., Green, supra note 18, at 1197-98 (basis of liability differs between negligence
and strict liability, issues of legal causation are inapplicable to strict liability); Maleson,
supra note 11A0, at 21-26 (courts analyze strict liability within traditional confines of negli-
gence).
152. The three theories are negligence, implied warranty and strict liability.
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increasingly obvious that they persist. Courts that were once con-
cerned with justifying exceptions to the privity limitation have
become similarly preoccupied with justifications for their occa-
sional departures from a standard of strict responsibility for all
harm resulting from the manufacturer of a defective product. The
analytical structure of the cases is curiously similar despite the
fact that the underlying premises have shifted radically from
limited fault-based liability to strict liability. The result is doc-
trinal havoc."
Strict liability emerged as a distinct theory of recovery in products
liability cases, not as an offshoot of the two traditional approaches,
warranty and negligence."' Thus, courts should analyze strict liabil-
ity as an independent doctrine governed by the distinct analytical
framework established by section 402A of the Restatement which
was explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.' Despite this express implementation of
the Restatement standard, however, the court stated that "[the
ordinary rules of causation and the defenses applicable to negligence
are available under our adoption of the Restatement rule."'57 In this
the court seems to have construed strict liability as a type of negli-
gence, not as an independent theory of recovery governed by the
standards and limitations expressed in section 402A. This unfortu-
nate confusion persists, appearing in the treatment of affirmative
defenses in subsequent Florida case law.
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In Hoffman v. Jones,' 7 the Supreme Court of Florida abrogated
the doctrine of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recov-
ery in favor of the more equitable concept of comparative negli-
gence.15 1 The supreme court adopted the "pure" form of compara-
tive negligence, in which plaintiff's recovery is merely reduced by
153. Maleson, supra note 110, at 12.
154. See, e.g., W. PRossER, supra note 109, at 494. Dean Prosser observed that the policy
underlying strict liability is "that the defendant's enterprise, while it will be tolerated by the
law, must pay its way." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, social justice requires that liability
be imposed on the defendant regardless of fault, because he is better able to bear the loss.
Id. For an amplification of the various public policy reasons for strict liability, see text
accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
155. 336 So. 2d 80, 88 (Fla. 1976). The supreme court recognized that strict liability was
to be construed as an "independent [body] of products liability law." Id.
156. Id. at 90.
157. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); see note 55 and accompanying text supra.
158. Comparative negligence is an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised in
defendant's answer. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) & 1.140(b).
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that proportion of fault attributable to him. 5 ' The Hoffman rule
was specifically limited to negligence actions, since, as the court
noted, comparative negligence is appropriate to a system of
"liability based on a fault premise."'' 0 Nevertheless, the supreme
court later extended the applicability of comparative negligence to
strict liability actions.' Therefore, under strict liability, plaintiff's
recovery is reduced by that proportion which can be attributed to
his own conduct in "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger."'' 2 Nevertheless, the courts are not cor-
rectly applying the new doctrine regarding strict liability cases but
are reintroducing fault principles into the theory to bar recovery
rather than apportion damages. One example of negligence termi-
nology in a strict liability context is the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, case of Watson v. Lucerne Machinery & Equip-
ment Co. 113 In Watson, the Second District essentially applied con-
tributory negligence standards to bar recovery under the guise of
proximate cause.
2. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Another traditional defense in products liability cases has re-
cently been abrogated in Florida. In Blackburn v. Dorta, "4 an action
sounding in negligence, the Supreme Court of Florida abolished
implied assumption of the risk"5 as an absolute defense, merging it
into the doctrine of comparative negligence. In an attempt to un-
ravel elements of the defense, which it designated "a potpourri of
labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts and doctrines,"'' 8 the court
divided the doctrine initially into primary and secondary assump-
tion of the risk.
The court quickly dismissed primary assumption of risk, find-
ing that it came within the general rubric of negligence and that no
purpose was served by continuing an artificial distinction. 7 In mov-
ing to secondary assumption of risk, the court further dissected the
159. 280 So. 2d at 438.
160. Id. at 436.
161. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
163. 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
164. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
165. Express assumption of risk, which was viewed by the court as a contractual concept,
was explicitly left untouched by the decision. The court defined express assumption of risk
as those situations involving either an express contract not to sue for injury or loss, or where
actual consent to participate was given. Id. at 290.
166. Id. at 290.
167. Id. at 291.
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doctrine by delineating two subcategories, pure or strict assumption
of the risk and qualified assumption of the risk.' The court dis-
missed pure assumption of the risk as an absolute defense, finding
that there was no justification for its continuance as a viable princi-
ple of law. After analysis of qualified assumption of risk, the court
concluded that there was no reason for distinguishing between this
defense and contributory negligence and held, therefore, that this
form of assumption of risk was merged into the defense of contribu-
tory negligence and was to be guided by the principles of compara-
tive negligence enunciated in Hoffman v. Jones.'
Assumption of risk is traditionally defined as voluntary and
unreasonable conduct in proceeding to meet a known danger.10 The
Supreme Court of Florida went to great lengths to distinguish the
various subcategories of the doctrine, only to hold that they all were
subsumed in contributory negligence, with the exception of express
assumption of the risk. This result was readily foreseeable after the
decision in Hoffman. Although the theory of recovery was based on
negligence, it is apparent that the abrogation would extend to all
three theories of recovery in products liability cases. The reasoning
of the court is applicable whether the action sounds in negligence,
implied warranty or strict liability. The root of the doctrine is plain-
tiff's conduct. Since Hoffman, plaintiffs conduct is no longer a
complete bar to recovery but rather a factor in determining dam-
ages. And so, if there is negligence, breach of an implied warranty
or an unreasonably dangerous defective product, plaintiff's conduct,
whether labeled contributory negligence or one of the enunciated
types of assumption of the risk, will only be relevant with respect
to apportioning fault.
3. THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DOCTRINE
Until recently, the open and obvious doctrine"' had been relied
on by Florida courts to defeat recovery by a plaintiff if it were found
that the danger complained of was obvious and patent to the reason-
able man.' The doctrine originated in a New York case, Campo v.
168. Pure assumption of risk was defined as conduct which bars recovery but is nonethe-
less reasonable. Implied assumption of risk was described as unreasonable conduct which bars
recovery. Id.
169. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
170. See Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An-Analysis and a Survey of Its Vitality,
29 MERCER L. REv. 583, 602 (1978).
171. Also referred to as the "patent danger" doctrine.
172. For a list of jurisdictions that also have repudiated the doctrine, see Darling, supra
note 170, at 606-08.
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Scofield, 73 and was introduced to Florida law in dictum by the case
of Matthews v. Lawnlite Co."'7 The underlying premise of the doc-
trine is that the manufacturer is under no duty to the plaintiff to
render a machine safe from readily apparent dangers. Thus, the
inquiry focuses upon plaintiff's conduct in light of the situation,
rather than upon defendant's negligence, breach of implied war-
ranty or manufacture of a defective product. With the demise of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk as absolute defenses,
however, the abrogation of the open and obvious doctrine appeared
certain, for it is nothing more than assumption of risk under a differ-
ent facade.
On January 18, 1979, the Supreme Court of Florida in a well-
reasoned decision confronted the issue in Auburn Machine Works
Co. v. Jones. 75 Plaintiff sought recovery for the loss of a limb, claim-
ing that the trench-digging machine which caused the injury de-
parted from reasonable engineering standards because it lacked a
simple chain guard which would have prevented plaintiff's injury.
Rejecting the defendant's assertion of the patent danger doctrine,,"
the supreme court held that the doctrine would no longer serve as
an absolute bar to recovery by an injured plaintiff. Rather, the
obviousness of the danger could only be utilized as a defense, guided
by the principles of comparative negligence.'" The court stated:
The patent danger doctrine encourages manufacturers to be
outrageous in their design, to eliminate safety devices, and to
make hazards obvious.
The patent danger doctrine protects manufacturers who sell
negligently designed machines which pose formidable dangers to
their users. It puts the entire accidental loss on the injured plain-
tiff, notwithstanding the fact that the manufacturer was partly
at fault. This is inconsistent with the general philosophy es-
poused by this Court.'78
In rejecting the doctrine as an absolute bar to recovery, the
supreme court recognized a burgeoning movement in other jurisdic-
173. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
174. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). "An implied warranty does not protect against hazards
apparent to the plaintiff." Id. at 301.
175.. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
176. Defendant relied primarily on Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1976). The court in Farmhand applied the doctrine subject to certification of the ques-
tion to the Supreme Court of Florida. But the supreme court was precluded from resolving
the question, because the case was settled on appeal.
177. 366 So. 2d at 1171-72.
178. Id. at 1170-71.
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tions. 179 In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals overruled the often
cited case of Campo in Micallef v. Miehle Co. 110 In abrogating the
doctrine, the court in Micallef noted: (1) that legal scholars have
long attacked it; (2) that the rigid doctrine is a vestige from pre-
products liability law; and (3) that it amounts to assumption of risk
as a matter of law. This compelling reasoning represents the trend
in the United States in actions for negligence, breach of implied
warranty and strict liability.18'
Significantly, the erosion of the open and obvious doctrine in
Florida began at the district court level. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, in Blaw-Knox Food & Chemical Equipment
Corp. v. Holmes,"'8 held that the doctrine was no longer viable in
an action based upon negligence:
Deprived of its support from New York, the viability of the
patent danger doctrine in Florida has further been put into doubt
by . . . Blackburn v. Dorta.
... [W]e now hold that the patent danger doctrine is also
merged into the defense of contributory negligence and the prin-
ciples of comparative negligence.1'3
The reasoning of the Fourth District was persuasive in light of the
recent Florida trend away from absolute bars to recovery. Anticipat-
ing the correct result in Auburn, 18' the Fourth District determined
that the patent danger doctrine should not alone bar plaintiff from
179. The modern trend in the nation is to abandon the strict patent danger
doctrine as an exception to liability and to find that the obviousness of the defect
is only a factor to be considered as a mitigating defense in determining whether
a defect is unreasonably dangerous and whether plaintiff used that degree of
reasonable care required by the circumstances.
Id. at 1169.
180. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). The decision in Farmhand,
which reaffirmed the Campo rule, see note 176 supra, was rendered prior to the Miscallef
decision and the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
181. See, e.g., Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1975) (obviousness
of danger does nothing to obviate the danger); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (obviousness of danger does not .ipso facto
preclude recovery); Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1976) (conduct of plaintiff
and condition and use of product are factual issues for jury, not a defense as a matter of law);
Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976) (held open and obvious doctrine
inconsistent with modern law of strict liability in tort); Olson v. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530 (N.D. 1977) (Campo rule does not preclude liability); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794
(Tex. 1975) (obviousness of peril not a defense to strict liability).
182. 348 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dismissed, 351 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1977).
183. Id. at 607.
184. "Blaw-knox . . . is consistent with our holding in the present case." Auburn, 366
So. 2d at 1172 n.2.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
presenting his case. Instead, the patentness of the danger should
serve merely as one factor in determination of liability.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, also confronted
the doctrine in Watson v. Lucerne Machinery & Equipment, Inc. "5
Although stating that it did not base its holding on the patent
danger rule,' the court clearly was influenced in holding against
plaintiff because it continually referred to the machine as one which
"presented obvious dangers."'8 7 The case indicates that the Second
District was uneasy with, as well as unsure of, the doctrine.
Predictably, this clear conflict among the district courts was
resolved by the supreme court. The decision in Auburn put to rest
a doctrine which had outlived its usefulness, if indeed it ever served
a proper function.' Moreover, the decision should be applauded in
that it once again brings Florida law within the modern trend of
products liability and harmonizes Florida law with the earlier deci-
sions which abrogated contributory negligence8 9 and assumption of
risk as absolute defenses.
C. The Spectres Linger
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has mandated a retreat
from absolute defenses to a comparative negligence standard, the
courts have been unable to deal adequately and consistently with
the new approach. As previously mentioned, the doctrines of contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk still act as bars to recovery
sub silencio in some cases. In Watson v. Lucerne Machinery &
Equipment, Inc., I' an employee was killed while under a citrus-
sampling machine after having been warned to stay clear of the
machine. Decedent's personal representative brought suit under
strict liability, alleging that the machine was defective due to inade-
quate safety devices. The District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that the decedent was the proximate cause of his own death.
185. 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1977).
186. Id. at 461 n.2. "Under Dorta it is arguable that the patent danger doctrine might
be included in one of the many variations of assumption of the risk." Id.
187. Id. at 461. The danger was "clearly visible." Id. at 460.
188. The doctrine has been severely critized by numerous commentators. E.g., L. Fau-
MER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.02 (1960 & Supp. 1978); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 28.5, at 1542-43 (1956); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a
Right: Manufacturer's Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065
(1973); Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 521 (1974).
189. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
190. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
191. 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1977).
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Proximate causation, however, is a term of art used in conjunction
with negligence principles. Nowhere in section 402A of the
Restatement or in the comments appended thereto is there a refer-
ence to proximate causation in the sense it is used under negligence
theories. Section 402A states that the manufacturer is liable for
physical harm "caused" to the plaintiff-meaning cause-in-fact of
the injury."' The correct analysis in Watson should have been that
although the machine was the "cause" of decedent's death, it was
not "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous."'' In other
words, it was not unreasonably dangerous when used properly.
Thus, the outcome of the Second District was correct, although the
opinion was incorrectly worded. The standard under a section 402A
action is that of a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." If
the product is such, then liability is imposed, with plaintiff's con-
duct only becoming an issue in measuring damages. The court,
rather than stating that the machine was not unreasonably danger-
ous, found that the death was not proximately caused by a defect
in the product. This unnecessary. determination only adds to the
confusion in distinguishing products liability theories and their re-
spective elements.' 4
Abolition of the "all or nothing" approach has served to shift
the steps of analysis in products liability cases. The landmark cases
have relegated plaintiff's conduct to a secondary level of inquiry.
The primary inquiry now should be whether the defendant acted
negligently, breached an implied warranty or introduced an unrea-
sonably dangerous defective product into the stream of trade. If
plaintiff can establish his case at this primary level, summary judg-
ments or directed verdicts would be inappropriate despite evidence
of plaintiff's misconduct.' 5 Instead, the secondary level of inquiry
should then focus on plaintiff's conduct in light of all the circum-
stances as well as the state of the art of the industry involved.' 6
Plaintiff, under the principles of comparative negligence, should
recover that proportion of the judgment due to defendant's liability.
In negligence actions, the recovery would be determined by
comparing the fault of the plaintiff, his own negligence, with that
of the defendant in failing to exercise due care. Under strict liabil-
ity, the analysis becomes somewhat more difficult because this
192. See Green, supra note 18, at 1197-98.
193. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
194. See also Wade, supra note 97, at 843.
195. Misconduct is here defined as contributory negligence or one of the many types of
assumption of risk.
196. See also Wade, supra note 97, at 843.
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theory properly does not encompass fault principles.' 7 In fact, many
commentators have severely criticized the use of comparative negli-
gence in a strict liability action, arguing that "[i]f we have aban-
doned fault as a touchstone of liability [in strict liability actions],
we must, of necessity, abandon its doctrinal trappings."'' 8 In es-
sence, within a strict liability theory of recovery, what is being com-
pared under comparative negligence is the conduct of plaintiff and
the defect in the product. The problems of apportioning fault be-
come obvious in this "apples and oranges" comparison. The solu-
tion may be found by using a balancing rationale, rather than the
doctrine of comparative negligence. Since a manufacturer is not an
insurer under strict liability,' defenses should be available to miti-
gate damages. Rather than using a doctrine founded in negligence,
however, the courts should use one that expressly takes into account
the industry and the consumer, in a balancing of costs and benefits.
Strict liability is a judicially-created doctrine, explicitly based upon
public policy considerations of risk allocation, cost distribution and
the hope of continual upgrading of safety standards.29' In keeping
with these policies, the issue is the condition of the particular pro-
duct, not the plaintiff's conduct in relation to that of the manufac-
turer.
D. Misuse
Although Florida case law indicates that the defense of misuse
is not utilized within the products liability framework, many juris-
dictions have introduced this "newly" developed defense in prod-
ucts liability cases. In essence, defendant is relieved from liability
if plaintiff uses the product in a manner not reasonably contem-
plated by the manufacturer and such misuse causes the injury.20' In
negligence cases, for example, it is said that it is the plaintiff's
abnormal use 2 of the product rather than the manufacturer's negli-
197. See note 154 supra.
198. Maleson, supra note 110, at 37. See also Note, Comparative Fault and Strict Prod-
ucts Liability: Are They Compatible?, 5 PPPERDiNE L. REv. 501 (1978).
199. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Note, supra note
198, at 506.
200. See Maleson, supra note 110, at 10-12.
201. Although the lower courts do not appear to have used'the concept in recent products
liability cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has mentioned misuse in the context of negli-
gence. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (1976).
One commentator advocates a similar balancing test for determining whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous. Maleson, supra note 110, at 35-38.
202. "Normal" usage may include conduct that defendant could reasonably foresee.
Also, defendant must take precautions either in product design or in warnings to prevent
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gence which proximately caused the injury. In implied warranty
cases, it is asserted that no warranty by the manufacturer attaches
to the misuse of a product; the manufacturer is entitled to rely on
the fact of a reasonable or intended use of his product.2 3 In some
jurisdictions, misuse in a strict liability case acts as a bar to recov-
ery.2 04
The misuse doctrine should be used not as an absolute de-
fense 205 but rather as a factor in determining whether the product
was dangerously defective. It may be that this interpretation would
aid the Florida courts in deciding strict liability cases. For example,
in Watson v. Lucerne Machinery & Equipment, Inc.,2o1 the tangled
discussion of proximate cause and obvious defect in the context of
strict liability was unnecessary. The court could have found that
misuse of the machine was the sole cause of the danger 207 and that,
therefore, the product in and of itself was not in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. "[S]trictly
speaking, [misuse] is not an affirmative defense, but is the con-
verse of the requirement that the product be used in a reasonably
foreseeable manner." 20 8
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is manifest that products liability law in Florida
is still unsettled, at least at the district court level. This state of
affairs springs not so much from the absence of guiding precedent
as from the confusion reigning among the opinions of the courts. As
the courts struggle to apply the three theories of products liability
recovery, they frequently fail to draw distinct lines between the
competing theories and their essential elements. History and habit
seem to have overcome the dictates of the Supreme Court of Florida
and the commentators as negligence, implied warranty and strict
liability are haphazardly invoked to support a court's conclusion
because of an inability to apply or to recognize the distinctions
harm. Defendant, however, is not liable for an unforeseeable, abnormal use of his product
which causes injury.
203. See W. PROSSER, supra note 109, at 639.
204. See Wade, supra note 97, at 846 (misuse should be used only in determining whether
product is unsafe, not whether plaintiff is "contributorily negligent").
205. See Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary with an Old
Meaning, 29 MERcER L. REv. 447, 458 (1958).
206. 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1977); see text
accompanying notes 193-95 supra.
207. Decedent was killed after he crawled under the machine.
208. Frank & Ringkamp, Products Liability Primer, in PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 415,
424-25 (L. Frumer & M. Minzer eds. 1978).
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inherent in each doctrine.
Strict liability, the emerging theory of products liability, has
become infested with elements of negligence due to some loosely
worded opinions. These decisions have served as precedent, estab-
lishing and perpetuating the confusion. This article has sought to
highlight this trend in the Florida courts, to segregate the various
theories, to facilitate their proper application, and to advocate an
increased sensitivity within the courts to the development of the law
in this field.
Strict liability has virtually supplanted the two "older" theo-
ries of recovery due in part to its lesser burden of proof and in part
to its facility of application without the use of the elaborate legal
fictions engendered by the older theories. Unfortunately, counsel for
plaintiffs continue to plead actions founded on all three theories.
While this tendency is understandable in light of the existing judi-
cial confusion, it enhances the opportunity of the courts to render
decisions which interweave threads of each cause of action. The
time has come for the courts to recognize and guard against this
tendency. Strict liability, as enunciated in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, should be the preferred choice of
the bench and the bar to resolve the vagaries of the present products
liability action.
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